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Interest in federalism issues was revived by the Supreme Court 
just in time for our bicentennial celebration of the Declaration of 
Independence. In 1976, by a 5-4 vote, in the case of National 
League of Cities v. Usery, t it overturned a law on tenth amendment 
grounds. Then in 1985, by another 5-4 vote, in Garcia v. San 
Antonio M. T.A. ,2 it reversed itself on the same law, replacing one 
view of the tenth amendment with another. Furthermore, in a spe-
cial demonstration of Bicentennial rhetoric, a dissenter in each 
case-Justice Brennan in Usery, Justice Powell in Garcia-claimed 
that that decision repudiated nearly two hundred years of constitu-
tional federalism. I shall discuss these cases shortly, but first I want 
to say something about the general subject of original intent. 
How can a Constitution that was written two hundred years 
ago properly be said to govern us today, in light of the massive 
changes in our territory as well as our population's size and hetero-
geneity? This question has given rise to what is commonly known 
as the battle between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. The 
scholars who introduced these terms a decade ago meant by "inter-
pretivism" that constitutional adjudication must be limited to 
norms inferable from the text, those demonstrably expressed or im-
plied by the framers. Finding this inadequate to justify decisions 
they thought were correctly decided, notably the abortion case but 
also the apportionment and school desegregation decisions, they ad-
vocated "non-interpretivism," which licenses courts to apply con-
• I am grateful to David L. Shapiro, James Stoner, Jr., and Barry Sullivan for reading 
and commenting on earlier drafts of this article. 
•• Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. This article was written while I 
was a Liberal Art Fellow at Harvard Law School, on leave of absence from Middlebury. I 
also received generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, in the 
form of a Constitutional Fellowship. 
I. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
2. lOS S. Ct. 1005 (1985). 
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temporary norms not demonstrably expressed or implied in the 
text.J This important debate came out of the academic closet in 
1985, when Attorney General Edwin Meese gave public addresses 
on constitutional jurisprudence. In one, after noting that the new 
terms replaced the older ones of strict versus loose construction, he 
quipped: "Under the old system the question was how to read the 
Constitution; under the new approach, the question is whether to 
read the Constitution."4 He called for a return to a "jurisprudence 
of original intention," (a clearer term for interpretivism). Acting on 
that principle, he said the Justice Department stood prepared to 
challenge the incorporation doctrine, according to which nearly all 
of the provisions of the original Bill of Rights have been applied 
against the states under the fourteenth amendment.s This drew 
from Justice Brennan a defense of an activist approach to individual 
rights and a twentieth-century reading of the Constitution.6 For 
Justice Brennan and his supporters, the choice is between being 
ruled by the dead hand of the past or the living present; for Attor-
ney General Meese and his supporters, the choice is between courts 
that say what the law is, which is their job, and courts that make 
law and policy, which is the job of legislatures. 
This debate on constitutional interpretation originated in indi-
vidual rights cases, but it affects federalism. First, when the Court 
upholds anyone's claim under the fourteenth amendment, it re-
stricts the state's political process. Second, and more directly, the 
Attorney General thinks that the Garcia decision "disregard[ed] ... 
the Framers' intention that state and local governments be a buffer 
against the centralizing tendencies of the national Leviathan," and 
therefore should be overturned.7 The "interpretivists" tend to give 
far greater weight to the judicial protection of states' rights, while 
the "noninterpretivists," or traditional judicial activists, tend to give 
the greater weight to judicial protection of individual rights. 
In Part I, I will examine the two Supreme Court decisions re-
3. Thomas C. Grey originated this terminology. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV., 703 (1975). See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1982). 
4. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, American Bar Association 4 (July 17, 
1985), excerpted in Apple, Meese Asserts U.S. Favors Press Code, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1985, 
at A7, col. 1. 
5. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, American Bar Association 15 (July 9, 
1985), excerpted in Taylor, Meese, in Bar Group Speech, Criticizes High Court, N.Y. Times, 
July 10, 1985, at Al3, col. 1. 
6. Address by Associate Justice William Brennan, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 
1985) (entitled The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, excerpted in 
Taylor, Brennan Opposses Legal View Urged by Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 
1, col. 2). 
7. Address, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
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ferred to, with special emphasis on the different theories of the 
enumeration of powers and the tenth amendment that different Jus-
tices presented. In Part II, I will look to the constitutional founding 
to determine what light can be shed on this constitutional contro-
versy. In my conclusion, I will reflect on the federalism analysis in 
light of the subject of constitutional interpretation generally. My 
inquiry assumes the appropriateness of having recourse to the 
founders' design in constitutional controversies, and in that respect 
I am on the side of the Attorney General. But I think he makes the 
task appear more straightforward than it is. 
I 
National League of Cities v. Usery was the first Supreme Court 
decision ever invalidating an act of Congress solely on tenth amend-
ment grounds. s The Court overturned the extension of the wage 
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state 
employees. In his court opinion, then Justice Rehnquist acknowl-
edged congressional power under the commerce clause to regulate 
wages and overtime for private employers. He read the tenth 
amendment, however, to preclude the exercise of such power "in a 
fashion that impairs the States' 'ability to function effectively in a 
federal system.' "9 While this phrase was first used in a 1975 case 
upholding a temporary wage and price freeze, Justice Rehnquist 
gave it, and with it the tenth amendment, a new meaning. When 
the minimum wage provisions were first upheld under the com-
merce clause in 1941, Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, said 
8. Previously when it struck down an act of Congress on federalism grounds, the 
Supreme Court started with a strict construction of an enumerated power of Congress, and 
then buttressed its argument with reference to the tenth amendment. See, e.g., Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 293-308 (1936) (construing the commerce clause to not permit 
Congress to regulate the wages, hours, and working conditions of coal miners, and including 
a reference to the tenth amendment as additional support for the argument); United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. I, 67-68 (1936) (construing the general welfare clause to not permit federal 
regulation of agriculture, and then referring to the tenth amendment for confirmation). For 
more on what came to be called "dual federalism," see infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
I am grateful to David L. Shapiro for emphasizing the significance of this use of the tenth 
amendment. He noted it in his article Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 293, 306-07 (1976). 
In her essay supporting Garcia, Martha Field notes that in his Usery opinion, then Jus-
tice Rehnquist "carefully avoided tying his doctrine to the tenth amendment," but instead 
"spoke of protecting 'the essential role of the states in our federal system.' " Field, Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 84, 90 (1985). Granted, but in the context of the case at hand, the general discussion 
about the role of the states, which in other contexts might refer to congressional apportion-
ment, must refer back to the tenth amendment. And here, as noted above, the tenth amend-
ment argument stands on its own, independent of a strict construction of congressional 
power. 
9. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). 
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that the tenth amendment "states but a truism that all is retained 
which has not been surrendered."to In Usery it was given an in-
dependent reach: 
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to 
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because 
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, 
but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that 
manner. II 
Justice Rehnquist's only reference was to a 1911 case which sug-
gested that Congress could not relocate state capitals or tell a state 
how to raise its taxes.12 But neither hypothetical example comes 
under Congress's enumerated powers to regulate commerce or to 
tax. 
The Court held that "insofar as the challenged amendments 
operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are 
not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."tJ 
This effects a compromise between states' rights and a liberal con-
struction of federal power under the commerce clause. It is a modi-
fied version of what used to be called "dual federalism."t4 Under 
that regime, the federal and state governments were regarded as 
equal in their separate spheres, and the congressional powers, espe-
cially under the commerce and taxing and spending clauses, were 
construed strictly. Congressional attempts to regulate monopolies 
were often frustrated, and similar attempts to support collective 
bargaining and regulate industries during the Depression were com-
pletely rebuffed. The Usery Court's opinion deferred to expediency 
and precedent on the commerce power issue, but it struck a blow 
for states' rights on the tenth amendment issue, thereby introducing 
a novel constitutional doctrine.ts 
Justice Blackmun concurred, providing the fifth vote, and 
wrote a brief opinion emphasizing the need for balancing the federal 
and state interests. Justice Brennan's dissent, which was joined by 
Justices Marshall and White, challenged the majority's tenth 
amendment analysis.t6 Neither he nor Justice Rehnquist made ref-
erence to founding materials. Both sides do so in Garcia. 
If the new version of dual federalism was to work, the Supreme 
10. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
II. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845. 
12. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). 
13. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (footnote omitted). 
14. See, e.g., Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. I ( 1950). 
15. See Shapiro, supra note 8. 
16. Justice Stevens also dissented. 
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Court had to be able to delineate the states' protected government 
functions. After nine years and several difficult cases, 11 in each of 
which the federal power was upheld, Justice Blackmun finally con-
cluded that the distinction between traditional and non-traditional 
functions could not be maintained. Consequently, in Garcia v. San 
Antonio M T.A., the Supreme Court overturned Usery and revali-
dated the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to all state 
employees.Is In his court opinion, which the previous minority of 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White joined, Justice 
Blackmun rejected the state sovereignty approach to the tenth 
amendment and articulated the following principle: "Apart from 
the limitation on federal authority inherent in Congress' Article I 
powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the 
federal Government itself."I9 
Justice Blackmun also cited James Madison's discussion in The 
Federalist No. 39, of how federalism is reflected in the structure of 
our government, and his statement in the First Congress that the 
test was whether Congress had the power, not whether it interfered 
with the laws of the state.2o 
The dissent consisted of the remaining members of the old ma-
jority, with Justice O'Connor replacing the retired Justice Stewart 
and joining Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and Burger. Justice Rehn-
quist wrote a one-paragraph opinion, joining the dissents of Justices 
Powell and O'Connor in predicting that the rule in this case would 
not last long. 
Both Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor referred to selected 
numbers of The Federalist for the proposition that the powers of the 
federal government are "few and defined" and that most of the busi-
ness of government would remain in the states.21 Justice Powell, in 
addition, stated that the tenth amendment was adopted "to ensure 
that the important role promised the States by the proponents of the 
Constitution was realized."22 Noting that the amendment "explic-
17. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 
(1982); United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Ho· 
del v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
18. This could be done because the Usery Court did not strike down the amendment, it 
only invalidated its application to state employees in traditional state functions. 
19. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1018. 
20. /d. at 1017-18; 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791). Justice Blackmun quotes from 
Madison's speech against the constitutionality of the proposed national bank. 
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Powell cites 
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 17, and 46 in Garcia. 105 S. Ct. at 1025-29 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); O'Connor cites THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 51. !d. at 1034 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
22. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1027 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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itly reserv[es] powers in the states," which, however, is not the same 
as reserving explicit powers, he wrote that "eight States voted for 
the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted 
after ratification," and each included "some version of what later 
became the Tenth Amendment." On this basis, Justice Powell con-
cluded that "judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is es-
sential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by 
the Framers and adopted in the Constitution. "23 
Justice O'Connor's dissent offered a different route to the same 
conclusion. She reinterpreted Chief Justice John Marshall's argu-
ment for liberal construction in McCulloch v. Maryland that the 
legitimacy of the end sanctions all means that are consistent "with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. "24 Emphasizing "spirit" 
and applying it to the tenth amendment, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that the states must "retain their integrity in a system in 
which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme."2s 
The other interesting part of her opinion concerned the reach 
of the commerce clause. After claiming that the framers thought 
the clause "important but limited," Justice O'Connor hastened to 
add that she did not think it "should be as narrowly construed to-
day."26 The needs of the twentieth century combined with the pur-
pose of the tenth amendment required a new form of judicial 
balancing. There may be something to such a balancing position in 
policy terms. The question is whether it is constitutionally com-
pelled, which is after all the prerequisite for judicial invalidation of 
an act of Congress. Since the main division on the Court turns on 
the tenth amendment, I will start my historical examination with 
the Bill of Rights and then turn to the enumeration of legislative 
powers. 
II 
When the absence of a bill of rights from the Constitution be-
came an issue in ratification, the Federalists first responded by say-
ing it was unnecessary, since under the federal Constitution, 
whatever power was not given was retained.27 The Anti-Federalist 
reply was twofold: first, substantial powers were granted, and sec-
ond, since some rights provisions were already included (no ex post 
23. /d. at 1027 ·28. 
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
25. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1036 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
26. /d. at 1034-35. 
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton); Address by James Wilson (Oct. 6, 
1787), reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 143-50 
(J. McMaster & F. Stone ed. 1888). 
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facto laws, no bills of attainder, no state laws impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts) the logical inference might be that only those 
rights were secured. 
The opponents had a good argument, and the Federalists had 
to find a way to respond to it without opening up a second conven-
tion, which they dreaded. The strategic move came in Massachu-
setts in January, 1788, where John Hancock and Samuel Adams 
successfully urged that Convention to vote for unconditional ratifi-
cation, with the understanding that amendments would be recom-
mended and sent on to Congress. It worked: Massachusetts ratified 
the Constitution by a vote of 187-168. Their recommended amend-
ments included, among others, a limit on federal taxation to foreign 
imports, a prohibition on the granting of monopolies under the 
commerce clause, guarantees for trial by jury in civil cases and the 
following general statement: "That it be explicitly declared, that all 
powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are re-
served to the several states, to be by them exercised."2s This was the 
Anti-Federalist form of what became the tenth amendment. The 
adverb "expressly," which was in the second article of the then ex-
isting Articles of Conferderation, would have dictated strict con-
struction of the enumeration. And it would have been a strict 
construction of substantially limited powers, if the Anti-Federalists' 
amendments had been accepted. In addition to those named, sev-
eral states wanted a prohibition on standing armies in peacetime. 
As a result, James Madison proposed a bill of rights early in 
the first session of the House of Representatives in June, 1789.29 In 
28. Massachusetts Ratification Convention, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 177 (J. Elliot ed. 1891) 
[hereinafter DEBATES]. 
29. I ANNALS OF CONG. 424,431-42 (J. Gales 1789). His proposals, with a few impor· 
tant changes, became the first ten amendments, or the Bill of Rights. Most notable among 
the changes was the form: Madison proposed inserting the amendments into the original 
text; others, following the model of many state constitutions, wanted them at the head; the 
majority, wanting to keep the original text distinct from subsequent changes, voted to put the 
amendments at the tail. See Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in EssAYS ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 32-48 (M. Judd Harmon ed. 1978). Next, 
Madison, in keeping with his concern that the rights of minorities are often abused in the 
states, proposed that "no state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of 
the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." It was not adopted, but it reveals Madison's 
concern about the threat that state governments posed to individual rights. Finally, 
Madison's first proposed amendment took the form of a declaration, found at the head of 
many state constitutions, that "all power is originally vested in, and consequently, derived 
from the people," and that "it must be exercised for their enjoyment, and that they retain the 
"unalienable and indefeasible right to reform or change [it],'" etc. Describing this provision 
alone as "what may be called a bill of rights," Madison said he never considered it essential 
but that it was "neither improper nor altogether useless." Unlike the Anti-Federalists, who 
tended to place great emphasis on general expressions of a people's rights against the govern-
ment, Madison was most interested in a structure that checks power with power. The propo-
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his speech introducing these amendments, Madison made it clear 
that this was a Federalist's bill of rights. It was his response to 
what he regarded as the people's legitimate concerns about the se-
curity of their rights, individual and collective. It was not a re-
sponse to states' rights. Referring specifically to proposals to 
change the structure and to limit the federal powers, Madison said: 
"I doubt, if such a door were opened, ... we should be very likely to 
stop at that point which would be safe to the Government itself."Jo 
Madison's speech virtually ignored federalism, as the Anti-
Federalists understood that principle: there was no reference to the 
need for a balance of power between the states and the federal gov-
ernment. His only reference to state legislatures occurred in a reply 
to a Federalist objection, which he had formerly held, that an in-
complete enumeration of rights might cause some to be inadver-
tently lost to the government. (The proposal which became the 
ninth amendment attempted to address this concern.) Madison ar-
gued that incorporating a bill of rights would make the courts "in a 
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights," and he expected the 
state legislatures to "jealously and closely watch the operations of 
this Government."3I Madison gave this example of an inappropri-
ate exercise of federal power: that Congress might enforce the col-
lection of revenues with general warrants, without probable cause. 
This was an individual rights example, not federalism. Speaking 
about what became the tenth amendment, Madison conceded that it 
"may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm in making 
such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as 
stated. "32 
Two House votes reveal how Madison's views were adopted 
against an Anti-Federalist version. Thomas Tucker, of South Caro-
lina, moved to give the people the right to instruct their representa-
tives, which would have permitted popular removal from office for 
non-compliance. It was defeated 41-10. Then Tucker moved to put 
"expressly" into what became the tenth amendment. First it was 
defeated without a recorded vote, and when it was brought up 
again, by Elbridge Gerry, it was defeated 32-17.33 
On the basis of this account of Madison's understanding of the 
sal passed the House but not the Senate, but we find an echo of its sentiment in the final four 
words of the tenth amendment, since Madison's original version did not contain the words 
"or to the people." I ANNALS OF CoNG. 433-34, 436 (J. Gales ed. 1789). 
30. ld. at 433. 
31. ld. at 439. Jefferson had presented this argument to Madison three months earlier. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), reprinted in THE PoRTA-
BLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 438 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (hereinafter PETERSON]. 
32. I ANNALS OF CONG. 441 (J. Gales ed. 1789). 
33. Id. at 147, 768. 
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tenth amendment, which was also the House's understanding, I 
think we may safely conclude that Justice Stone got it right in 1941 
when he said the tenth amendment is a "truism" that merely refers 
back to the enumeration of powers. If any addition is required, it is 
that it also refers back to the people's pre-political powers. 
There was no full debate in the Federal Convention on the 
scope of congressional powers. We can only consider the context 
within which the enumeration was framed, the alternatives that 
were known or considered, and two decisions bearing on commerce. 
To begin with, in 1787 federal systems were understood by all 
to give primary political power to the states composing the larger 
political association. The Articles of Confederation exemplified this 
with its incomplete federal structure, congressional reliance on the 
states for requisitions of men and money, and state control of the 
congressional delegates. The Virginia plan,34 which Madison au-
thored and which became the basis of the Constitution, boldly pro-
posed a complete national government. It included a general grant 
of legislative power, along with a national negative on the states, 
and a nationally based apportionment. The negative was dropped, 
in favor of national supremacy, which it was assumed the judiciary 
would enforce. The general grant was replaced by the enumeration, 
along with the necessary and proper clause, and the Great Compro-
mise, which Madison opposed, established state equality in the Sen-
ate. Within this context, how should we understood the shift from 
a general grant to an enumeration of powers? 
I draw on Madison here, because of his importance as a framer 
and because he reflected deeply on these constitutional matters. 
First, he explained his original formulation, the general grant, as 
preferable to an enumeration, since the latter might leave out some-
thing important. Second, in the speech of his that prefigured the 
famous defense of the extended sphere in The Federalist No. 10, 
Madison argued that the objects of the proposed government in-
cluded not only defense, security, and foreign relations generally, as 
Roger Sherman suggested, but also "the security of private rights, 
and the steady dispensation of Justice."3s Then, when asked how 
the states would retain some portion of their sovereignty under the 
Virginia Plan, Madison, after saying the threat would be from the 
states, offered this principle for determining federal power: 
As far as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as 
34. I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-22 (M. Farrand 
ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND]. 
35. /d. at 134; cf THE FEDERALIST numbers cited by Justices Powell and O'Connor, 
supra note 21. 
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far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the Genl. Govt. itself would 
concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. 
Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to extend its care to every requisite object 
without the cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not be less free as 
members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. 36 
This exceedingly broad principle surely covers anything that 
Congress has ever enacted under the commerce clause. However, 
the speech came before the Great Compromise on representation, 
before the Convention voted to delete the congressional negative on 
state laws, and before the Committee on Style transformed the gen-
eral grant into an enumeration, complete with the necessary and 
proper clause. How much did that change Madison's principle?37 
No more than this, I suggest: Congress must show a reasonable 
connection between what it regards as expedient and an enumerated 
power. To use the language of civil procedure, the initial burden of 
production is on Congress, but after that is met, a substantial bur-
den of persuasion must be borne by anyone challenging the action's 
constitutionality. That is my understanding of what a liberal con-
struction of Congress's powers means. In support of this interpreta-
tion, the framers were aware of an alternative restrictive 
formulation. Had Roger Sherman's proposal been accepted, the fi-
nal clause would have read, "in carrying into execution the forego-
ing powers, and all others, no laws shall be passed but such as are 
necessary and proper and which do not interfere with the internal 
policy of the several states, unless it is absolutely necessary." 
Two of the Convention's decisions bear on the commerce 
clause. First, and most important, as part of an important sectional 
compromise, the southern states agreed to give up a virtual sec-
tional veto on navigation acts in exchange for a twenty-year period 
for slave importation.3s Second, on the last full business day of the 
Convention, a proposal to add an enumerated power to cut canals, 
36. I FARRAND, supra note 34, at 357. 
37. In his essay, Charles F. Hobson discusses the importance that Madison attached to 
the proposed national negative as a means of preventing the ordinary tendency of power to 
revert to the parts in a federal system. While Madison was not sure that after-the-fact judicial 
enforcement of the "supremacy clause" would suffice, he did, as Hobson points out, make the 
best of the proposed Constitution during ratification. Hobson's argument, as he presents it in 
his conclusion, is that Madison only "retreat[ed] from his high nationalism of 1787" in re-
sponse to Hamilton's economic plans. Only then did he come "to appreciate the balance 
between the federal and national features of the government, a balance that he had celebrated 
in The Federalist, but without inner conviction." Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: 
James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. AND 
MARY Q. 215, 235 (1979). Michael Zuckert discusses Hobson's essay but he regards 
Madison's federalism, even in the Convention, as less national than Hamilton's. He does not 
discuss the speech of Madison's which I have quoted in the text above. Zuckert, Federalism 
and the Founding, 48 REV. PoL. 166, 197-98 (1987). 
38. Cf 2 FARRAND, supra note 34, at 25. 
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which was then enlarged by Madison, to a power "to grant charters 
of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require & the 
legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent," was 
briefly considered and voted down 8-3, after being limited to 
canals.39 In the course of consideration, Rufus King (Massachu-
setts) suggested that the power was unnecessary and then said that 
"the States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it," be-
cause "in [Philada.] & New York it will be referred to the establish-
ment of a Bank."40 
Madison made brief reference to this decision in the House, in 
February 1791, when he opposed the national bank on constitu-
tional as well as political grounds, as did Secretary of State Jefferson 
in his opinion on the subject, which President Washington solic-
ited.4t Neither placed great weight on this argument. I mention it 
because it raises an important question for original intention juris-
prudence: how does one assess speeches and/ or votes, as a means of 
understanding a document or a part of it? In this particular case, 
Raoul Berger, a prominent scholar of the "original intent" school, 
regards the evidence as conclusive against the bank's constitutional-
ity.42 I find the result inconclusive because it was not an "up or 
down" vote on a bank, and moreover, even if it had been, the ques-
tion wold have remained whether a bank was reasonably related to 
the commerce power, or the power to tax and spend, or the power 
to borrow money. 
On the other hand, H. Jefferson Powell has argued that the 
framers themselves expected that subsequent interpretation would 
be entirely textual and structural, on the model of common law in-
terpretation.43 This proscription on the "extra-textual" seems to 
me to go too far, since much can be learned from a careful study of 
39. See id. at 364-65, 369-75, 400, 449-53. The navigation act in question concerned 
special protection or the nascent American shipbuilding industry. A two-thirds vote of both 
houses would have given the South a veto over any commercial regulation favoring, or requir-
ing, use of American ships for exports. 
40. 2 FARRAND, supra note 34, at 615-16. 
41. In his speech to the House on February 2, 1791, Madison said "he recollected that a 
power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the General Government and 
rejected." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791). 
The argument that followed was based on the enumeration of powers, the necessary and 
proper clause, and the power of incorporation. His conclusion did not refer to the brief 
discussion in the Federal Convention. See id. at 1896-1901. For Jefferson's argument, which 
is similar, see his Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National Bank, in PETERSON, supra 
note 31, at 261-67 (dated February 15, 1791). 
42. See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (forthcoming). I am 
grateful to Mr. Berger for letting me study his manuscript and for the time he gave me during 
my leave of absence as a Liberal Arts Fellow at Harvard Law School. 
43. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985). 
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legislative history. And, if that information is excluded, historically 
incorrect arguments about the structure of the government may be 
drawn, as Powell acknowledges in his discussion of states' rights. 
As for the framers' intention on the interpretation question, it is 
hard to say. The Federal Convention was, after all, held in secret. 
Madison kept his Notes confidential, and they were only published 
after his death in 1836. It is true that Madison himself, in letters 
later in his life, played down the Federal Convention for the under-
standing of the people during ratification. But his argument-
which sharply distinguished the Convention's proposed constitution 
from a ratification-seems to confuse what validates with what 
might instruct. That is, I think we can learn a good deal from 
Madison's Notes of the Federal Convention, along with the votes 
taken, and on some issues we can learn more from these sources 
than from the ratification debates. 
The ratification struggle, which began after the Federal Con-
vention adjourned on September 17, 1787, and was effectively com-
plete by the summer of 1788 when Virginia and New York became 
the tenth and eleventh states to vote for the Constitution, focused 
on the substantial powers given the new federal government. As the 
Federalists framed the debate, it was the importance of union for 
the common defense and the blessings of liberty which led to a dis-
cussion of the powers necessary to secure those objects. To the 
Anti-Federalists, who conceded the need for some revisions in the 
Articles, the federal powers were so extensive in the proposed Con-
stitution and the representation was so inadequate, that the result 
was bound in time to be a consolidation of power in the national 
government and the consequent loss of liberty. The Anti-Federal-
ists held a traditional conception of republican liberty; this included 
a small territory, a homogeneous population, substantial representa-
tion, and a simple, mild government. To defend the proposed Con-
stitution as consistent with republican government, the Federalists 
offered a less restricted definition of that form-one that required 
nothing more than direct or indirect popular election to office-and 
argued that the larger, more diversified sphere was more suitable to 
republican government because majority tyranny was more effec-
tively restrained. 
A related debate and revision of definitions took place in con-
nection with federalism. The Anti-Federalists claimed that they 
were the true Federalists, since federalism, or especially federal re-
publics, gave primary consideration to the parts, where true republi-
can government was sustained. Many admitted the need for 
effective national supremacy, but they emphasized the essential role 
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of the states. Without severe restrictions on federal power, federal-
ism would be lost and with it, republican liberty. The few would 
rule, rather than the substantial middle classes, and government by 
persuasion would be replaced with government by coercion. 
In response, Madison constructed an entirely new definition of 
federalism. In place of state primacy, or even a clear preservation 
of a nation-state balance, he emphasized the ways in which the 
states were recognized in the structure of the new federal govern-
ment. On the basis of the mode of ratification in the states, the 
mode of election and representation, the operation and extent of the 
powers, and the mode of amendment, Madison was able to argue 
that the Constitution was "in strictness neither a national nor a fed-
eral constitution; but a composition of both. "44 
I think this shows that in its focus, the Federalists' view of 
federalism corresponds to that of the Garcia majority-national 
supremacy, with the states' presence and importance guaranteed in 
the constitutional structure itself, while in its focus the Anti-Feder-
alists' view of federalism corresponds to that of the Usery majority 
and Garcia minority--concern over a loss of republican liberty as a 
result of big government. 
Turning to the enumeration of powers, I think the evidence 
supports a liberal construction over a strict construction, notwith-
standing The Federalist's reassurances about the powers remaining 
in the states. By that I mean, and here I draw on the debate over 
the national bank, that reading "necessary" (in the "necessary and 
proper clause") as convenient or useful, and hence granting Con-
gress a choice of means, is sounder than reading it to include no 
more than what would be essential to effectutate an enumerated 
power. But, to paraphrase Jefferson's most telling argument against 
implied powers, we need to consider how liberal a construction can 
be read into the necessary and proper clause without doing violence 
to the enumeration of powers clause altogether. If the enumeration 
becomes effectively a general grant of power, is that still a legitimate 
construction? After discussing the evidence for liberal construction, 
I will take up that question in my conclusion. 
The characteristic argument of The Federalist on this question 
is that the means, the enumerated powers, must be proportional to 
the ends, the objects of union. Those objects include the common 
44. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961). For 
Madison's earlier views on federalism, see his July 14, 1787 speech in the Federal Conven-
tion, 2 FARRAND, supra note 34, at 8-9. For a further account of Anti-Federal Constitution-
alism, see my essay The Case Against Ratification: Anti-Federalist Constitutional Thought, in 
THE CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF ITS RATIFICATION AND FRAMING (L. Levy & 0. Ma-
honey eds. 1987). See also H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981). 
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defense, the preservation of public peace against internal and exter-
nal attacks, and the regulation of commerce with other nations and 
between the states. Publius charges the Anti-Federalists with want-
ing all the benefits of union without being willing to pay the price, 
in terms of effective government. And they can't have it both ways: 
For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to a government, 
the direction of the most essential national interests, without daring to trust it with 
[sic] the authorities which are indispensable to their proper and efficient manage-
ment. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but embrace a rational 
altemative.45 
This is only the most striking of many such arguments in The 
Federalist. 
In addition, Publius presents full and candid arguments for un-
conditional powers to raise armies and taxes.46 The discussion of 
the commerce power, however, does comport with Justice 
O'Connor's description; the examples include the removal of inter-
state tariffs and foreign commercial treaties. As for the necessary 
and proper clause, Governor Edmund Randolph provided a good 
discussion of it in the Viriginia Ratification Convention, and Pub-
lius discussed it in two places. Randolph argued that since "a con-
stitution differs from a law," a liberal construction was necessary, 
although he did not agree with the Anti-Federalists who argued 
that under this clause, the general welfare clause or the supremacy 
clause, the new government would be able to do anything. 47 The 
Federalist passages support a similar position. The Federalist No. 
33 argues that "it is expressly to execute these powers, that the 
sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the na-
tional legislature to pass all necessary and proper laws."4s And The 
Federalist No. 44 explains that in the absence of the clause "all the 
particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general pow-
ers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable 
implication. "49 
Turning to The Federalist passages relied on by Justices Powell 
and O'Connor for the proposition that most of the powers remained 
in the states, I do not think a fair reading supports strict construc-
tion. In The Federalist No. 17 it is said that since the administra-
tion of civil and criminal justice remains in the states, the people's 
affections will remain there. 
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 151 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
46. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-36 (A. Hamilton). 
47. 3 DEBATES, supra note 28, at 8-9. 
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 205 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961) (emphasis in 
original). 
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 304 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961). 
1987] FEDERALISM 247 
That essay replied to the objection that the federal government 
would swallow up the states. The subject is continued in The Feder-
alist No. 27, which replied to the contention that the federal gov-
ernment would need military force to make it operate on an 
intransigent people. Publius's intention in each essay was to reas-
sure the people, and what he emphasized in The Federalist No. 17, 
concerning the people's affections, was called into question in The 
Federalist No. 27, where it was said that the people's affections are 
won over by a good administration. On this score The Federalist 
clearly looked to the federal government. As for the references to 
few and limited federal powers in The Federalist Nos. 45 and 46, 
from other discussions, some of which were cited above, it is clear 
that they may be few but they cannot be called limited. As Publius 
put it in The Federalist No. 30, "in the usual progress of things, the 
necessities of a nation in every stage of its existence will be found at 
least equal to its resources. "so And there is no indication that the 
commerce clause was intended to have a permanently limited reach. 
III 
I have just completed an argument that the tenth amendment 
does not support special protection for the states, beyond what is 
implicit in the enumeration of powers itself, and that the enumera-
tion of powers was understood by the Constitution's framers and by 
both sides in the ratification debates to contain a liberal grant of 
legislative powers. The evidence points emphatically toward the co-
operative federalism approach taken by the Garcia majority. That 
means the enumerated powers, especially the power to tax and 
spend for the general welfare, the power to regulate commerce 
among the states, and the necessary and proper clause, were viewed 
as giving Congress a choice among all convenient means that are 
reasonably related to an enumerated power.s1 For this reason, I 
think the Attorney General's conception of original intention juris-
prudence is too restrictive on the federalism question. How can 
strict construction, or a states' rights interpretation of the tenth 
amendment, be called interpretivism when the Federalists were lib-
eral constructionists and they were responsible for the language of 
the Bill of Rights? 
I think that Congress still must make the case for its exercise of 
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 190 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961) (emphasis 
omitted). 
51. In a recent confirmation of this principle, the Supreme Court voted 7-2 to uphold 
the federal law providing for the withholding of part of Federal highway funds otherwise due 
to states that allow people under twenty-one to drink. South Dakota v. Dole, 55 U.S.L.W. 
4971 (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No. 86-260). 
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legislative power. In our cases, as long as there is a clear constitu-
tional justification for passing a minimum wage law, it can clearly 
be applied to state employees, especially since the line between the 
public and the private sector is so elusive. For example, it seems to 
me that withholding federal highway money from states that do not 
raise their drinking ages to twenty-one, in light of the evidence con-
cerning drinking and automobile accidents and the ages of the 
drinking drivers, is clearly constitutional. The cases I focused on 
both involved the regulation of the states as employers. Many 
others involve the regulation of local activity either because it af-
fects interstate commerce or as a means of prohibiting shipment or 
movement in interstate commerce. Both arguments were made in 
the case upholding the minimum wage law in 1941. Professor Ger-
ald Gunther has been critical of the latter approach, on the grounds 
that under it Congress never has to show the connection between 
the local activity and the national economic problem.s2 I would 
agree that such a connection must be shown, but it seems to me that 
in most cases, including racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, loan sharking, and gambling,sJ it can be done. 
I think there are three justifications for an outcome that trans-
forms an enumeration into a virtual general grant of power. First, 
the development of federal power under the commerce and taxing 
and spending clauses follows the Federalists' emphasis on liberal 
grants of power and their expectation that if the Constitution 
worked the federal government would gain in authority and power. 
Second, when the Supreme Court intervenes to maintain some form 
of dual federalism, it has short-circuited the political process .. And 
there does seem to be something to the argument, made by Justice 
Blackmun, with support from The Federalist and modem schol-
ars,s4 that federalism is preserved in that political process. Here I 
52. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 144 (11th ed. 1985). 
53. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. 
Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953). The results in these cases are more straightfor-
ward than the rationales. That is because constitutional law remains burdened with terminol-
ogy from the "dual federalism era." The constitutional language, after all, is "commerce 
among the states," not "interstate commerce." 
54. See CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL POWERS (1980); 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: 'The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selecting of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Scholars critical 
of Garcia include Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recur-
rence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789 (1985) and Van Alstyne, The Second 
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (9185). Both argue that judicial review plus the 
tenth amendment justify the Usery court's approach to the conflict between the state's police 
power and Congress' power over commerce, see Howard, supra, at 789; Van Alstyne, supra, 
at 1719-20. Neither argues for a return to "dual federalism," and yet neither acknowledges 
the novelty of judicial enforcement of tenth amendment federalism despite a broad view of 
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would take note of Madison's shift on federalism by saying that the 
Constitution surely permits one to make the argument for either 
strict construction or for some special tenth amendment support for 
the states. That does not mean that such a position is necessitated 
by the Constitution, and hence that the Court should adopt it. 
Even Jefferson was aware that an argument could be made for lib-
eral construction and the bank's constitutionality. He therefore 
urged President Washington to sign the bill, out of deference to 
Congress, if the President was not certain of its unconstitutional-
ity.ss This restricted view of the presidential veto has been dis-
carded, but the point applies to the courts, which should not be 
invalidating laws that are merely plausibly unconstitutional. 
Finally, speaking about interpretivism generally, if the Consti-
tution's language is restricted to what the framers clearly had in 
mind, and nothing else, if even general language is construed ili the 
narrowest possible terms, then it may have to be amended as fre-
quently as laws, and there is good reason to doubt that this would 
be a good thing for constitutional government. 
Even in the Garcia approach to federalism, the states remain 
active if subordinate partners in American government. While the 
position of cooperative federalism reflects the Federalist view, the 
Anti-Federalist concern about the importance of states as a buffer 
against centralization is also present. One example of the states' 
vitality in the political process concerns their effectiveness in retain-
the commerce clause. Robert F. Nagel took a similar position in his defense of Usery, written 
before Garcia. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National Leage of Cities in Per-
spective, 1981 SuP. Cr. REv. 81. 
The only supporter of an Usery approach to federalism who focuses not on the tenth 
amendment by itself but the enumeration of powers is Sotirious A. Barber. Arguing that 
"[r]eal damage came to the Tenth Amendment when Congress was permitted to develop a 
national police power under its powers over commerce and taxation," Barber suggests that 
the state governments are entrusted with government ends, such as "educational excellence," 
which are even more important than the ends entrusted to the national government, which 
include "economic prosperity, national defense, fundamental civil liberties, and racial jus-
tice." S. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amend-
ment?, 1976 SuP. Cr. REv. 161, 171, 179. This is a more consistent position than the one 
taken by the Garcia minority and the other critics of Garcia, but it is even more emphatically 
the federalism of the Anti-Federalists. The Supreme Court should not be imposing it on the 
nation where Congress has been able to make a plausible case for its action. 
Lawrence H. Tribe and Frank I. Michaelman have also written separate but related 
articles in defense of Usery. Each scholar argues for a special state role for protecting individ-
ual rights, the right to have certain services provided at certain levels. These are both crea-
tive arguments but no attention is given to the framers' intent with respect to the powers of 
Congress and the tenth amendment. See Michaelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Per-
mutations of"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1182-91 
(1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative 
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1075-78 (1977). 
55. See the last paragraph of Jefferson's opinion in PETERSON, supra note 31, at 267. 
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ing federal deductions for state and local taxes. 56 It is important for 
the states with high property and income taxes that their residents 
receive a federal deduction for states taxes. Given the importance 
of federal taxes, individual mobility, and the resulting unequal dis-
tribution among the states of social welfare costs, this deduction 
seems to strengthen state governments and to be desirable. 
Federalism is also alive and well in the courts. Neither Con-
gress nor the federal courts have extended article III jurisdiction 
nearly as far as constitutionally permissible, and the Supreme Court 
in particular has been especially respectful of state law, as long as it 
does not contradict federal law. And even if it does, it is generally 
necessary to follow state law procedures for appeal in order to re-
ceive federal judicial relief.s7 To speak, as Professor Van Alstyne 
has, of Garcia as the "second death of federalism,"ss is surely 
hyperbole. 
56. For an account of the congressional deliberations on these provisions of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), see CoNG. Q. WEEKLY 
REPORTS 179-81, 592, 1008, 1571-72, 1953, 2118, 2351 (1986). 
57. See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 550-52 (1985), 
(Shapiro describes, with approval, the federal courts' abstention from exercising jurisdiction 
in the name of comity and federalism). 
58. See supra note 54. 
